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MODERN MEDIA AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: REDISCOVERING
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
Donald E. Lively*
Abstract: Freedom of the press, like other constitutional guarantees is not an absolute.
Nor does it have the same meaning for all media. For more than a century after the
constitution was framed and ratified, the press was coextensive with publishing. Over the
course of the twentieth century, electronic media have emerged and extended the contours
of the press. At the same time, however, liberty of the press has developed in idiosyncratic
terms that have fostered a First Amendment hierarchy. While print media continue to be
afforded maximum constitutional security, newer communications methodologies have
been more susceptible to official management and control. Broadcasting, although the
dominant mass medium, is the least protected segment of the press. The diminished First
Amendment status of radio and television reflect dubious assumptions about their scarcity
and impact that, especially given the advent of even newer media and sources of competi-
tion, are increasingly obsolete. As constitutional decisions concering emerging media rep-
resent a forced choice betweeen respective models for print and broadcasting, the risks to
traditional concepts of editorial autonomy have compounded. Particularly as the diluted
consitutional standards have become accepted for the nation's most pervasive medium, the
danger is that oversight rather than freedom will become habitual and normative rather
than exceptional. This Article suggests that constitutional and general policy interests
would be better served by foregoing balkanization and dilution of First Amendment prin-
ciples in favor of universal standards reflecting traditional assumptions that minimize offi-
cial monitoring and mangagement of the press.
Broadcasting over the past half-century has become the nation's
dominant mass medium. Radio and television's penetration into the
modem information marketplace is nearly universal.I The potential of
newer media such as cable is bounded by investment and capitaliza-
tion requirements.2 Access to older media such as newspapers and
magazines remains conditioned by unit costs and literacy require-
* Professor, College of Law, University of Toledo. J.D. (1979), University of California, Los
Angeles; M.S. (1970), Northwestern University; A.B. (1969), University of California, Berkeley.
Research for this article was supported by a grant from the University of Toledo College of Law.
1. In 1992, a total of 9,572 radio and 1,136 VHF and UHF television stations operated
commercially in the United States. Summary of Broadcasting and Cable, BROADCASTING,
March 9, 1992, at 52. Radio service in 1988 reached 99 percent of the nation's households,
which contained an average of 5.6 radios per home. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1991, No. 919, at 556. Television service was received in
98.2 percent of the nation's households, which averaged 2.0 television sets per home. Id. Cable
in 1989 had penetrated 56.4 percent of the nation's television households. Id. Daily newspaper
circulation in 1990 was 63 million and thus had a per capita exposure rate of .251. Id.
2. Cable systems require relatively high start-up costs for wiring a community. Militating
against universal cable service are the possibilities of unprofitable returns from investment in
rural areas and the emergence of newer technologies, such as multipoint distribution service
(MDS), which may provide channel multiplicity in urban areas without expensive wiring costs.
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ments.3 Broadcasting thus seems destined to retain its primacy into
the foreseeable future.
Despite and perhaps because of its prominence, the United State
Supreme Court has determined that "of all forms of communication, it
is broadcasting that... receive[s] the most limited First Amendment
protection."4 This appraisal preceded any attention by the Court to
whether newer media, specifically cable television, had First Amend-
ment status. Subsequent jurisprudence has reveal.ed that cable not
only is constitutionally protected, but may have more expressive lati-
tude than radio or television.5 As a consequence, programming that
may be identical or at least displayed on the same terminal is distin-
guished for regulatory purposes on the basis of how it was
transmitted.6
Ordinarily, relative influence or effectiveness of expression is not an
apt consideration in determining freedom of speech.7 To account for
such factors would result in constitutional security only for ineffective
or inconsequential expression.' The diminished constitutional status
of broadcasting, however, results in a deviation from such First
Amendment norms. It also establishes a model that competes with
traditional First Amendment precepts for purposes of determining the
meaning of press freedom for emerging media.
For a discussion of cable economics and other new media, see DONALD E. LIVELY, MODERN
COMMUNICATIONS LAW 257-87, 527-29 (1991).
3. Expenditures of money, time and effort establish costs that some "may not be able to
afford." FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 775 (1978) (Brennan, I., dissenting). Literacy is
a threshold requirement for access to the print media.
4. Id. at 749 (upholding federal regulation of indecent programming).
5. The Supreme Court has determined that cable "plainly implicate[s] First Amendment
interests," City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 495 (1986),
"and is, in much of its operation, part of the 'press.'" Leathers v. Medlock, 1 I1 S. Ct. 1438,
1442 (1991). It also has affirmed a decision striking down a state law punishing indecent cable
programming. Community Television, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Utah 1985),
aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Wilkinson 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986), af'd, 480 U.S. 926 (1987).
Critical to the invalidation of state regulation was the sense that cable did not present the same
hazards to children and privacy that broadcasting purportedly does. Id. at 1113-14.
6. From a viewer's perspective, it is unlikely that broadcast and cable transmissions are
significantly distinguishable. See Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1448 (D.C. Cir.
1985), cert. denied, sub nor. National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Quincy Cable TV, Inc., 476 U.S.
1169 (1986) ("cable and broadcast television appear virtually indistinguishable" to viewer).
7. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790-92 (1978) (invalidating restrictions upon
corporate spending in political campaigns); Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v.
FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987) ("unwilling to
endorse an argument that makes the very effectiveness of speech the justification for according it
less first amendment protection").
8. Telecommunications Research, 801 F.2d at 508.
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Constitutional analysis of broadcasting was obsolete even when the
scarcity premise was introduced as a basis for content regulation.9 As
new media continue to evolve and expand, however, the selective
attention to and limitation of broadcasting seems even more anachro-
nistic and counterproductive. During the nation's first century, official
editorial oversight was exceptional rather than normative. 10 The
emergence of new media in the republic's second century presented an
opportunity for reconsidering and eventually delimiting press free-
dom."1 As the nation courses into its third century, and especially as
evolving media integrate the capabilities of multiple communications
technologies, a fundamental constitutional choice emerges between
analytical models that respectively prohibit and favor official manage-
ment of the information marketplace. The purpose of this Article is to
(1) review the conventional wisdom with respect to regulation of
broadcasting; (2) demonstrate how the managing of public interests in
broadcasting has proved to be a treacherous exercise and unworthy
model for media regulation; and (3) suggest that constitutional stan-
dards and analysis should be guided not by medium-specific standards
but by First Amendment norms that nonetheless may account for
unique problems presented by a particular communications
methodology.
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Reduction of radio and television's First Amendment interests is
grounded historically in concern that broadcasting is a scarce medium.
Nearly a decade after the Communications Act of 193412 was enacted,
the Supreme Court recounted broadcasting's chaotic formative years
9. As discussed infra note 25, daily newspapers were more scarce than broadcast outlets when
fairness regulation was upheld pursuant to scarcity considerations. Moreover, insofar as other
media, including newspapers, magazines and an emerging cable industry provided competing
sources of information, the focus on scarcity suffered from a limited focus.
10. In its first direct reckoning with the freedom of the press clause, the Court observed that
The fact that for approximately one hundred and fifty years there has been almost an entire
absence of attempts to impose previous restraints upon publications relating to the
malfeasance of public officers is significant of the deep-seated conviction that such restraints
would violate constitutional right . . . . The general principal that the constitutional
guaranty of the liberty of the press gives immunity from previous restraints has been
approved in many decisions under the provisions of state constitutions.
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 718-19 (1931). Enactment of the Sedition Act in the late
eighteenth century and southern legislative efforts to ban anti-slavery literature in the 1830s
reveals that previous attitudes were not characterized by unbounded tolerance. The Sedition Act
was never litigated, however, and state-imposed restrictions on expression did not implicate free-
dom of the press under the Federal Constitution until this century.
11. See infra notes 35-37, 137-46 and accompanying text.
12. 47 U.S.C. § 151-605 (1988).
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and identified what it considered to be "certain basic facts about radio
as a means of communication-its facilities are limited; they are not
available to all who may wish to use them; the radio spectrum simply
is not large enough to accommodate everybody.""3 In articulating the
scarcity rationale as a basis for federal regulation of radio and televi-
sion, the Court emphasized that governmental authority was not lim-
ited to establishing a rational allocation scheme for broadcast
frequencies.14 It thus determined that the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) not only could direct traffic but could take into
account its composition.15
A quarter of a century later, the Court alluded to the scarcity prem-
ise in refusing to recognize "an unabridgeable First Amendment right
to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak,
write or publish."16 In so doing, it introduced as an overarching con-
stitutional interest the public's "collective right to have the medium
function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amend-
ment... which is paramount" to the rights of broadcasters. 17 Scar-
city, which originally had justified regulation to create order out of
confusion, thus became a basis for content control calculated to pro-
mote First Amendment values of diversity and fairness.18
Attention to these constitutional goals engendered what even the
Court acknowledged to be an "unusual order" of First Amendment
interests.1 In identifying a new set of constitutionA rights and elevat-
ing them above the editorial freedom of broadcasters, it established a
dubious analytical predicate. The Court in other contexts has
acknowledged that it "is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegiti-
macy when it deals with judge-made law having little or no cognizable
roots in the language or design of the constitution.""0 Reaction to
13. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943) (noting that
regulation was essential to ensure that "potentialities of radio were not to be wasted").
14. Id. at 217.
15. Id. at 215-16 (FCC is more than a "traffic officer, policing the engineering and technical
aspects of broadcasting").
16. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969) (upholding fairness doctrine
pursuant to premise of spectrum scarcity).
17. Id. at 390.
18. Fairness regulation, including provisions for balancing of controversial public issues and
replies to personal attacks and political editorials, was premised upon the notion that "[b]ecause
of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is permitted to put restraints on licensees in
favor of others whose views should be expressed on this unique medium." Id.
19. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm, 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973)
(spectrum scarcity necessitates "an unusual order of First Amendment values").
20. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) (refusing to find state anti-sodomy law
at odds with Fourteenth Amendment).
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judicial delineation of fundamental rights pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment almost invariably elicits criticism that the Court has
"creat[ed] rights out of whole cloth that are not in the constitution."21
Such review, however, at least attempts to discern what is "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty" or "deeply rooted in this Nation's his-
tory and tradition." 22
Introduction of a paramount public right capable of trumping edito-
rial freedom was the function of no such analytical limiting principle.
Although perhaps a constitutional interest or even, arguably, a com-
pelling concern, public access to or receipt of diverse information is
not provided for by a text that concerns itself with editorial discre-
tion.2" What the Court has referred to as an "unusual order" is a
euphemism for turning the First Amendment on its ear.
Especially problematic has been the concept of scarcity insofar as it
is selectively applied to broadcasting. As one appeals court has noted,
scarcity is a universal phenomenon.24 It also, at least arguably, is a
more profound reality in the print media, where content regulation
considered fit for broadcasting has been rejected as constitutionally
inapt.2" Given their status as an endangered species, major daily
newspapers receive preferential treatment under the antitrust laws,
which evokes complaints that First Amendment interests are actually
undermined.26
21. See Ronald Brownstein, With or Without Supreme Court Changes, Reagan Will Reshape
the Federal Bench, 49 NAT'L J. 2338, 2341 (1984) (noting criticism of fundamental right to elect
abortion on grounds that identification of it "creat[es] rights out of whole cloth that are not in
the Constitution").
22. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194.
23. The text of the First Amendment refers to "freedom of the press" rather than its intended
consequences which may include diversity of expression. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
24. Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1986),
cerL denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987) (noting that "[s]ince scarcity is a universal fact, it can hardly
explain regulation in one context and not another").
25. Even when spectrum scarcity was constitutionally approved as a basis for fairness
regulation in Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), the sum of daily newspapers
was 1,838, contrasted with a total of 6,519 radio stations and 862 television stations. U.S. DEPT.
OF COMMERCE, supra note 1, at 556; U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNrrED STATES 1991, No. 932, at 560.
26. The Newspaper Preservation Act allows competing newspapers to merge their
production, advertising and business operations when one of the publications is in probable
danger of economic failure. Newspaper Preservation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1802(2), 1803(b) (1988).
The resultant combines are exempt from antitrust laws and have been challenged, albeit
unsuccessfully, on grounds they effectively prevented or deterred competition. See Committee
for an Indep. P-I v. Hearst Corp., 704 F.2d 467, 482-83 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 896
(1983) (claim that antitrust exemptions diminished First Amendment interests rejected on
grounds they "lacked substantial merit"); Bay Guardian Co. v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 344 F.
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A common and more pertinent characteristic of all mass media is
the reality that the primary impediment to ownership and operation is
the requirement of substantial capital.27 Modem jurisprudence has
yet to factor in that reality, even as the economic and competitive real-
ities of broadcasting have dampened investor and entrepreneurial
interest in radio and television.2" In the meantime, new rationales for
limiting the First Amendment status of broadcasters have material-
ized. Unlike regulatory premises that were intended to enhance diver-
sity, concern with the medium's pervasive nature and accessibility to
children have been used to limit expressive pluralism.2 9 Although the
"unusual order" and its attention to diversity is confounded by such
content limitation, recent jurisprudence suggests persisting prioritiza-
tion of the right to receive rather than disseminate information."0 In
subscribing to the scarcity principle, the Court indicated it would
reconsider if future circumstances warranted reevaluation." Acquired
habit has indicated a capability of becoming established custom, how-
ever, at the expense of constitutional principle.
3 2
II. MEDIA CHARACTERISTICS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
INVERSION
Broadcasting's use of what is characterized 2s a scarce public
resource has had uniquely profound constitutional implications.
Because broadca.ting frequencies are finite and considered within the
Supp. 1155, 1157-58 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (Newspaper Preservation Act not at odds with First
Amendment).
27. Relevant jurisprudence maintains that, in theory, anyone can publish, and that the
primary impediment to doing so is economic reality. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 412 U.S. 241, 250-52 (1974). Even in broadcasting, persons otherwise interested in
obtaining a license may be precluded by officially prescribed financial qualifications. See
Financial Qualifications, 45 Rad. Reg. 2d 925 (P & F 1979) (prospective licensee must have
resources to operate station for three months without any advertising revenue).
28. The diminished profitability of broadcasting has prompted the FCC to raise ownership
caps from twelve AM and twelve FM stations nationwide and no more than one AM and one
FM station in a single market to thirty of each total and up to six in a single market. Joe Flint,
Radio's Magic Numbers BROADCASTING, March 16, 1992, at 4, cols. 1-3.
29. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749-50 (1978) (broadcasting's accessibility to
children and pervasive and intrusive nature justifies indecency controls).
30. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3010 (1990) (scarcity justifies
regulatory efforts to promote diversity including racially preferential licensing policies).
31. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 396-401 (1969).
32. Tradition and custom may impede objective assessment of constitutional requirements.
Official segregation was upheld, for instance, pursuant to a sense that it merely reflected
established customs and usage. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896), overruled by,
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Overlooked was the ascertainable reality that
such a system established a dominant class, grounded in the ideology of white supremacy, that
defeated constitutional interests in civil equality. Id at 560 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
604
Vol. 67:599, 1992
Modem Media and the First Amendment
public domain, government has been allowed "to tell some applicants
that they could not broadcast at all because there was room for only a
few."33 From allocational realities requiring selection of licensees in a
competitive process, and consequent exclusion of some applicants, has
followed the proposition that "it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First
Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every indi-
vidual to speak, write, or publish."34
The distinction between broadcasting and print represents a crucial
departure point in charting the constitutional status and protection of
a mass medium. Such differentiation is relatively recent in its formali-
zation but discernible in early responses to the emergence of mass
media as an industry. As new communications methodologies began
to evolve in the early part of this century, the Court's initial response
was wariness." Such caution with respect to the advent of motion
pictures translated into a refusal to recognize the medium as part of
the press. By the middle of the century, the Court acknowledged that
"expression by means of motion pictures is included within the...
guaranty of the First and Fourteenth Amendments."36 This determi-
nation, however, denoted an analytical beginning rather than an end
point. The Court thus related that even if constitutionally protected,
"each [new medium] tends to present its own peculiar problems" that
justify variances in First Amendment standards.3 7
The focus upon distinguishing characteristics, rather than func-
tional similarity, has engendered a First Amendment hierarchy for the
press analogous to the ranking of expression. In the freedom of speech
context, expression is classified and protected according to its per-
ceived value.3" For freedom of press purposes, media are categorized
33. Red Lion Broadcasting, 395 U.S. at 388.
34. Id.
35. See Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915) (motion pictures
"not to be regarded ... as part of the press of the country").
36. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948) (acknowledging First
Amendment status of motion pictures).
37. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502-03 (1952) (acknowledging but
qualifying motion pictures' First Amendment status).
38. Speech pertaining to informed self-government, or political expression, tends to be the
highest valued and thus most protected form of expression. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co.
v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 561-63 (1980). Commercial speech is
protected but subject to less rigorous review. It is also susceptible to requirements of disclaimers
and warnings and less immune to prior restraint. See Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 n.24 (1976). Recovery for defamation of
a public official or figure is denied, insofar as actual malice is not demonstrated, to afford
breathing room to First Amendment interests in uninhibited debate. See Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342-46 (1974) (defamed public officials and public figures may not recover
absent proof of actual malice). Speech unprotected by the First Amendment includes obscenity
605
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and ranked pursuant to identification of unique problems.3 9 Among
modem mass media, broadcasting is the least protected, print is the
most secure, and cable is in between.' Characteristics of broadcasting
identified as constitutionally distinguishing, however, are not necessar-
ily unique.
The Court has recently reminded that "[w]e have long recognized
that '[b]ecause of scarcity of [electromagnetic] frequencies, the Gov-
ernment is permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others
whose views should be expressed on this unique medium."'" Identifi-
cation of the supposedly peculiar characteristic of scarcity has been
the basis for both structural and content control iia radio and televi-
sion. The FCC has required and the Court has upheld, for instance,
fairness regulation,42 ownership ceilings 3 and minority preferences"
in the licensing process on grounds that it is necessary to manage the
interests of diversity.
If justified only on grounds of using a scarce public resource, scar-
city-based regulation should logically extend to other mass media.
Newspapers and magazines, for instance, distribute their product by
and fighting words. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 54 (1973) (obscenity
unprotected expression); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (fighting
words unprotected expression).
39. See, eg., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969) (the departure
point for identifying constitutional status of broadcasting is the principle that "differences in the
characteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to
them"); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502-03 (1952) (the departure point for
identifying constitutional status of motion pictures is the principle th-,t each medium "tends to
present its own peculiar problems"); Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1448 (D.C.
Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nor. National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Quincy Cable TV, Inc., 476
U.S. 1169 (1986) (the departure point for identifying constitutional status of cable televsion is the
principle that "differences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First
Amendment standards applied to them" (quoting Red Lion Broadcasiing, 395 U.S. at 386.)).
40. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) ("of all fcrms of communication, it
is broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment protection"); Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) ("governmental regulation of this crucial
process [of editorial discretion] can[not] be exercised consistent with First Amendment
guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time"); City of Los Angeles v. Preferred
Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494-95 (1986) (cable shares characteristics of both print
and broadcast media).
41. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3009-10 (1990) (upholding minority
preferences in licensing process pursuant to scarcity premise and concern with content diversity).
42. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co., 395 U.S. at 367 (upholding fairness regulation).
43. See FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 US. 775 (1978) (upholding
restrictions on cross-ownership of co-located newspapers and broadcast stations); United States
v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956) (upholding quantitative limits on total number of
broadcast holdings by single owner).
44. See Metro Broadcasting, Ina, 110 S. Ct. at 2997 (1990) (upholding minority preferences in
licensing process).
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use of public highways, street corners and especially newsstands and
newsracks that are subject to zoning and placement controls. Modem
production and distribution processes also implicate the airwaves and
allocation of satellite time for transmitting the editorial product to dis-
tant printing facilities. Scarcity is also a phenomenon with respect to
cable insofar as pole attachment space is limited and subject to com-
peting uses by utilities and, where competition is present, by other
cable companies.45
The notion of scarcity, while not unique to any medium, may pres-
ent special problems that merit customized attention. Analysis of
such problems, however, requires sensitive appraisal rather than
wholesale judgment. Licensing systems for the press, for instance,
generally have been disfavored as a constitutionally impermissible
form of prior restraint.'
Although such control is presumed to be unconstitutional and sub-
ject to a heavy burden of justification,47 a compelling argument exists
with respect to broadcasting that spectrum scarcity requires a rational
allocation scheme for distributing frequency access and use. A pre-
regulatory history of chaos and confusion, ensuing from ungoverned
competing uses, provides support for at least that governmental inter-
est and involvement.4" Similarly, cable franchising may be justified by
limited pole space and concern for disruption of other public interests
such as efficient use of thoroughfares and rights of way and aesthet-
ics.4 9 Except perhaps for content-neutral vending licenses that limit
street and sidewalk congestion, the interest in managing the distribu-
tion of printed information seems neither extensive nor profound.
Although such common sense distinctions among media exist, and
provide a reasonable basis for regulatory variances, constitutional
analysis has extended the differentiations beyond the point of logic.
Regulation promoting content diversification, for instance, was upheld
45. See City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 492 (1986)
(franchising city refers to "physical scarcity of available space on public utility structures").
46. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931) (noting that English licensing laws were
eventually recognized as offensive to the central meaning of liberty of the press).
47. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (system of
prior restraint subject to "heavy presumption against its constitutional validity" and "heavy
burden of showing justification").
48. The early history of broadcasting, when competing uses of frequencies resulted in
widespread interference and consequent "confusion and chaos," is discussed in National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210-17 (1943).
49. See Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1449 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub
nom. National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Quincy Cable TV, Inc., 476 U.S. 1169 (1986); Omega
Satellite Prod. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 127 (7th Cir. 1982).
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for broadcasters,5" foreclosed for newspapers,51 and left open for cable
operators.5 2 With respect to radio and television, the Court observed
that
[t]here is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Govern-
ment from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to
conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those
views and voices which are representative of his community and which
would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves. 53
Without even mentioning that special responsibility of broadcasters,
the Court soon thereafter concluded that similar demands for fairness
in the print media "fail[ed] to clear the barriers of the First Amend-
ment because of its intrusion into the function of editors." 54 The
Court later suggested that it might reconsider the scarcity premise as a
justification for content control in broadcasting, if Congress or the
FCC signaled its deficiency or obsolescence.55 Despite the FCC's
eventual abandonment of the fairness doctrine,56 and divestment of the
underlying scarcity premise, the Court reaffirmed tae vitality of spec-
trum scarcity as a principle for "[s]afeguarding the public's right to
receive diverse views and information over the airwaves. '57
Experience with the fairness doctrine itself proved problematic on
both practical and constitutional grounds. Instead of facilitating, it
impeded diversity, insofar as broadcasters avoided programming that
would require balancing, might alienate controversy-sensitive advertis-
ers and could result in administrative and litigative burdens. 8
Although the FCC regularly deferred to reasonable and good faith
50. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388-90 (1969) (upholding fairness
regulation against First Amendment challenge).
51. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (right of reply statute
invalidated as offensive to the First Amendment).
52. Chicago Cable Communications v. Chicago Cable Comm'n, 879 F.2d 1540, 1549 (7th
Cir. 1989), cert denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990) (upholding local origination requirements on
grounds they promote substantial interest in content diversity without excessively burdening
First Amendment interests).
53. Red Lion Broadcasting Co., 395 U.S. at 389.
54. Miami Herald Publishing, 418 U.S. at 258 (invalidating right of reply statute on grounds
it invades constitutionally protected editorial autonomy).
55. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376-77 n.l1 (1984) (noting
widespread criticism of scarcity rationale but unwilling to reexamine it minus signal from FCC
or Congress that it is obsolete).
56. In re Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5055 (1987), aff'd, Syracuse Peace
Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (affirming elimination of fairness doctrine on
grounds it disserves regulatory and constitutional interests), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990).
57. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3010 (1990).
58. See Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. at 5049-50 (particularizing reasons for
eliminating fairness doctrine).
Vol. 67:599, 1992
Modem Media and the First Amendment
judgments of licensees,5 9 its emphasis upon the overarching signifi-
cance of fairness obligations and availability of sanctions, including
license revocation or denial of renewal, presented the potential for
dangerous regulatory abuse.' Because the doctrine was seldom
enforced in actuality, but possibly could be used in a way that pro-
foundly undermined First Amendment interests, official policy offered
the worst of constitutional and regulatory principles.
Jurisprudential emphasis upon scarcity as a unique characteristic of
broadcasting remains unqualified by principles needed to limit or focus
its operation. Analytical acuity is compromised further by a failure to
grasp more significant common attributes. Scarcity is a characteristic
common to all mass media for the same overarching reason.61
Notwithstanding reasoning that attempts to distinguish allocational
and economic scarcity, ownership and control of any mass medium is
primarily a function of available capital.62 Case law suggests that at
least in theory anyone can publish, or perhaps obtain a cable franchise,
and that the only restrictions upon such opportunity are economic
realities.63 Even minus the panoply of factors that enter into broad-
cast licensing decisions, however, most persons could not acquire a
radio or television station because they lack the necessary and substan-
tial resources for capitalization. 64
The concept of scarcity nonetheless has been critical to a unique
understanding of the First Amendment, which has identified and ele-
59. Over a two-year period, for instance, the FCC received 4,280 fairness complaints but
found only 19 actual violations. Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public
Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 58 F.C.C.2d 691, 709 (1976) (Comm'r Robinson,
dissenting).
60. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 393-94 (1969) (if licensees prove
"timorous" in executing fairness responsibilities, FCC "need not stand idly by" but may use full
range of sanctions associated with license as "temporary privilege").
61. One court has observed that "[a]ll economic goods are scarce, not least the newsprint, ink,
delivery trucks, computers, and other resources that go into the production and dissemination of
print journalism." Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 508
(D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987).
62. Allocational scarcity is a phenomenon attributed to regulatory intervention that assigns
frequencies in a scarce spectrum. Economic scarcity is a reality that results when conditions do
not afford profits to justify an investment. The variants of scarcity have been critical in charting
disparate medium-specific standards. See, eg., Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434,
1450 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (cable distinguished by economic rather than allocational scarcity), cert.
denied sub nora National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Quincy Cable TV, Inc., 476 U.S. 1169 (1986);
Community Television, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099, 1112 (D. Utah 1985) (cable may be
economically scarce but not limited to finite number of channels and thus more akin to
newspaper than broadcasting), aff'd sub nora Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986),
aff'd, 480 U.S. 926 (1987).
63. See supra note 61.
64. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
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vated the rights of viewers and listeners above those of broadcasters. 6,
In abandoning the fairness doctrine, the FCC suggested that the rights
of broadcasters and publishers should be coextensive. 6' The premise
may be apt, but its articulation is incongruous with reality. By empha-
sizing that the paramount rights of the public would be served better
by fairness deregulation, the Commission did not entirely dismantle
the "unusual order" of constitutional rights which inverts traditional
precepts of editorial freedom.67 Concurrently, it also enunciated new
standards for indecency regulation that impose medium-specific con-
tent restrictions.68
In a series of actions culminating in a statement of principle and
subsequent appeals, 69  the FCC determined that sexually oriented
expression found to be "patently offensive as measured by contempo-
rary community standards for the broadcast medium" was actionable
when "a reasonable risk [exists] that children may be in the audi-
ence."70 To balance the competing interests of adults and children,
the FCC limited indecent programming to post-midnight hours. 71
65. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the right of the
viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.").
66. In re Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5055-57 (1987), aff'd sub nom. Syracuse
Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990).
67. Id. at 5057 ("the right of viewers and listeners to receive diverse viewpoints is achieved by
guaranteeing them the right to receive speech unencumbered by government intervention").
68. New Indecency Enforcement Standards to be Applied to All Broadcast and Amateur
Radio Licensees, 2 F.C.C.R. 2726 (1987) (reaffirming authority to regulate indecent
broadcasting).
69. The FCC found actionable indecency in: In re Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 2 F.C.C.R.
2705, 2706 (1987) (expression at issue was "patently offensive, and [its] sexual and excretory
import . . . clear"); In re Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 2 F.C.C.R 2703 (1987) (sexually
referenced lyrics on university radio station "patently offensive.., by contemporary community
standards for the broadcast medium"); In re Pacifica Found., 2 F.C.C.R. 2698, 2700 (1987)
(theatrical references to sexual and excretory organs or functions were patently offensive). Upon
petition for reconsideration, the FCC reaffirmed its finding that the "indecent broadcasts were
aired when there was a reasonable risk that children may have been in the audience." In re
Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 3 F.C.C.R. 930, 934 (1987) (identifying violation but providing
warning for broadcast indecency that ran after midnight). Id. at 937-38 n.47. The court of
appeals approved the Commission's attention to indecent expression but found that the time
channeling was too restrictive and remanded for more precise standards for permissible hours.
Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The
Commission responded with a comprehensive ban on indecent programming, pursuant to the
rationale that the risk of children being in the audience was omnipresent. Enforcement of
Prohibitions Against Broadcast Indecency, 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1988), 5 F.C.C.R. 5297, 5306
(1990). The court of appeals found the standard constitutionally inadequate and remanded with
a demand for accommodation of indecent expression at specified times. Action for Children's
Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504, 1510 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3599 (1992).
70. Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 3 F.C.C.R. at 934; New Indecency Enforcement Standards to
be Applied to All Broadcast and Amateur Radio Licenses, 2 F.C.C.R. 2726 (1987).
71. Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 3 F.C.C.R. at 937-38 n.47.
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Although charting a safe harbor, the rule was invalidated by an
appeals court which considered it inadequately justified.72 Thereafter,
the Commission adopted a comprehensive ban on indecency, which it
attempted to justify on grounds that technology did not afford a less
restrictive alternative for protecting the interests of children.73 That
proscription also was vacated by the court of appeals, which found
that "neither the commission's action [totally] prohibiting the broad-
cast of indecent material, nor the Congressional mandate that
prompted it, can pass constitutional muster."' 4 The FCC thus has
been required to determine when indecent expression may be broad-
cast, to define the class of children to be protected and what consti-
tutes a risk to them, and to amplify the nature and scope of the
government's interests in regulating such programming.7 5
Competing policies for advancing and defeating diversity are nota-
ble primarily for their departure from traditional First Amendment
norms. Initiatives for managing expressive pluralism considered
endangered by scarcity at best were ineffectual and at worst constitu-
tionally subversive. Persisting efforts to curb indecent expression have
been detached from the scarcity premise and its diversification ideal.
Such content restriction, especially insofar as constitutionally pro-
tected expression is implicated, suggests the possibility that regulation
has become a function of habitual attitude accustomed to diminishing
First Amendment pertinence rather than serious justification that
accounts for constitutional imperatives.
III. THE PERILS OF PUBLIC INTEREST MANAGEMENT
The Freedom of the Press Clause traditionally has been understood
as a safeguard of editorial discretion.76 At least in theory, unfettered
editorial autonomy has been valued as a means of facilitating "unin-
hibited, robust and wide-open" debate7 7 and as a check upon govern-
72. Action for Children's Television, 852 F.2d at 1341.
73. Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Indecency, 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1988), 5
F.C.C.R. 5297, 5306-08.
74. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504, 1509 (D.C. Cir 1991), cert.
denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3599 (1992).
75. Id. at 1510.
76. See, ag., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (official
intrusion into editorial control and judgment not "consistent with First Amendment guarantees
of a free press as they have evolved to this time").
77. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (liability for defamation of
public official requires proof of actual malice).
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mental authority."8 Even for traditional media, the First Amendment
is subject to compromise when a significant reason exists for limiting
editorial freedom or expression is classified as less valuable or unpro-
tected.79 First Amendment principles are not irrelevant to broadcast-
ing. What is different about their operation with respect to newer
media such as radio and television, however, is that they must com-
pete against explicit regulatory demands that may determine not only
content" but, by the process of licensing, may select the editors
themselves.
Regulation of broadcasting for the past half-century has been a
function of the Communications Act of 1934.81 The enactment cre-
ated the FCC which is empowered to set and enforce standards for
broadcasting.2 The FCC's general charge is "to make available, so
far as possible, to all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient,
Nation-wide and world-wide wire and radio communication service
with adequate facilities at reasonable charges .... ."I3  Centralization
of regulatory authority contemplated a panoply of responsibilities that
were to be exercised with reference to the "public interest, convenience
or necessity." 84
The public interest standard has evolved as the touchstone criterion
for regulating broadcasting.8 5 The concept is manifestly amorphous,
78. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND.
REs. J. 521, 527 (watchdog function safeguards against abuse of power by public officials).
79. See, eg., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
391 (1973) (upholding city ordinance prohibiting gender designated "help-wanted" advertising in
newspapers).
80. Despite abandonment of the fairness doctrine, see supra note 56 and accompanying text,
special content provisions govern personal attacks, 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920 (1990), political
editorials, 47 C.F.R. § 73.1930 (1990), and response time for political candidates when a
competitor has appeared, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1988), and access opportunities for political
candidates, 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1988). Content regulation in the form of local origination
requirements and access provisions also governs cable. See Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984, 47 U.S.C. § 531(a) (1988) (public, governmental and educational access); id., § 532(b)
(commercial access); Chicago Cable Communications v. Chicago Cable Comm'n, 879 F.2d 1540,
1549 (7th Cir. 1989) (origination requirements), cert denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990).
81. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-605 (1988).
82. The FCC was created by 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). Its general authority is enumerated in
47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (1988) and its specific power to regulate broadcasting is set forth in 47 U.S.C.
§ 303 (1988).
83. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988) (describing purposes of Communications Act of 1934 and creating
FCC).
84. Id. § 303 (specifying regulatory duties that include classifying radio stations, prescribing
type of service to be rendered by each class of licensees, assigning frequencies, setting technical
standards for equipment, preventing interference, and making rules and regulations necessary to
effectuate congressional aims).
85. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (i943) (upholding network
restrictions as consistent with the public interest).
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but the Supreme Court has considered the standard to be "as concrete
as complicated factors for judgment in such a field of delegated
authority permit."86 Although resistant to precise definition, the pub-
lic interest has been characterized as "the interest of the listening pub-
lic in the 'larger and more effective use of radio.' -87
From the public interest criterion have emerged a multiplicity of
rules and regulations that in other First Amendment contexts would
be constitutionally unacceptable."8 Central to the Communications
Act of 1934 is a scheme for licensing broadcasters.89 The licensing
process is the primary methodology for avoiding the chaos and confu-
sion experienced in an unregulated electronic marketplace." Basic
qualifications with respect to citizenship,9" character,92 financial9 3 and
technical qualifications, 94 restrictions upon total broadcast holdings,95
and employment practices,96 represent elements of a selective process.
The exclusive nature of the system may be somewhat reminiscent of
86. FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940).
87. National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. at 216 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (1988)).
88. Indecency controls and fairness regulation, for instance, have been upheld in
broadcasting. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 38 U.S.726 (1978) (upholding indecency regulation);
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding fairness regulation).
Restrictions on indecent programming have been invalidated in cable. See Community
Television, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Utah 1985), aff'd sub nora. Jones v.
Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 480 U.S. 926 (1987) (striking down state law
regulating indecent cable programming). A right to reply statute pertaining to newspapers,
although intended to effect fairness and balance, was found at odds with the First Amendment.
See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (state law invades
constitutionally protected editorial discretion).
89. 47 U.S.C. §§ 307-313 (1988) (providing for distribution and terms of licenses, factors
considered and procedures for awarding licenses, ownership restrictions, and sanctions).
90. National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. at 213-16 (licensing a response to disorganization
and waste of radio spectrum).
91. 47 U.S.C. § 310(b)(1) (1988) ("[n]o. .. license shall be granted to or held by... any alien
or the representative of any alien").
92. Id. § 308(b) ([a]ll applications . . .shall set forth such facts as the Commission by
regulation may prescribe as to the... character... of the applicant to operate the station").
93. Id. ("[a]ll applications... shall set forth such facts as the Commission by regulation may
prescribe as to the... financial... qualifications of the applicant to operate the station").
94. Id. ("[a]l applications ... shall set forth such facts as the Commission by regulation may
prescribe as to the... technical... qualifications of the applicant to operate the station").
95. FCC regulations, establishing national and local ceilings upon ownership of radio and
television stations, recently have been relaxed to allow common ownership in up to 60 radio
stations nationwide and up to 6 radio stations in a single market. JOE FLINT, supra note 28, at 4,
cols. 1-3. Legislation has been proposed, however, that would reintroduce multiownership caps
of twelve AM and twelve FM stations and duopoly rules restricting ownership to one AM and
FM station per market. Id. A single person or entity may own no more than twelve television
stations. 47 C.F.R. § 73.5555(d) (1990).
96. 47 C.F.R. § 73.2080 (1990) (prohibiting broadcasters from engaging in discrimination
against designated minorities and requiring broadcasters to establish affirmative action plans).
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the English system of licensing printers, a practice that was abandoned
in the 17th century97 and condemned in seminal freedom of the press
jurisprudence. 98 Although specific components may be open to chal-
lenge, the broadcast licensing process itself would likely survive the
strong presumption against systems of prior restraint.99
More problematic are policies that, in purported service of the pub-
lic interest, have regulated content. Fairness regulation, as discussed
in the preceding section, originated from the premise that the" 'public
interest' in broadcasting clearly encompasses the presentation of vigor-
ous debate of controversial issues of importance and concern to the
public.""lc ° The FCC eventually determined that new technologies
provided diversity in the general information marketplace, the fairness
doctrine retarded rather than facilitated diversity, and a system of offi-
cial review presented inherent First Amendment risks. It thus con-
cluded that the public interest was served better by affording
broadcasters the same First Amendment protections extended to the
print media. 01
The determination that radio and television should have the same
constitutional status as newspapers is the function of a possibly tran-
sient policy decision rather than First Amendment ordination. Der-
egulatory trends that characterized FCC governance of broadcasting
during the 1980s 2 are subject to agency reconsideration and congres-
sional reversal. The Supreme Court has acknowledged widespread
criticism of spectrum scarcity as a basis for broadcast regulation.10 3 In
97. See DONALD LIvELY, supra note 2, at 19 (Crown's licensing of printers terminated in
1694).
98. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) ("liberty of the press, historically
considered and taken up by the Federal Constitution, has meant, principally although not
exclusively, immunity from previous restraints or censorship").
99. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
100. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 385 (1969).
101. In re Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5055-57 (1937), aff'd, Syracuse Peace
Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1989).
102. The FCC during the 1980s not only abandoned the fairness doctrine, see id, but
eliminated regulation duplicating federal or state law, see Elimination of Unnecessary Broadcast
Regulation, 59 Rad. Reg. 2d 1500 (P & F 1986), and diminished various reporting requirements
and obligations to ascertain important community issues. See Revision of Programming and
Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment Requirements and Program Log Requirements for
Commercial Television Stations, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076 (1984); Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d
968 (1981). The possibility of eliminating racially preferential licensing policies was checked by
congressional directive, and such provisions were upheld in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,
110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (upholding preferences for designated minorities in comparative licensing
process and distress sales).
103. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376-77 n.11 (1984) ("prevailing
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so doing, the Court asserted that it was "not prepared, however, to
reconsider our longstanding approach without some signal from Con-
gress or the FCC that technological developments have advanced so
far that some revision of the system of broadcast regulation may be
required."" °  Pursuant to mixed messages from the FCC and Con-
gress, which respectively have repudiated"0 5 and reintroduced the fair-
ness doctrine,10 6  the Court has maintained its investment in
established regulatory premises as being "essential to the welfare of
the public." 107
Continuing efforts to regulate indecent programming"0 8 further evi-
dence how public interest perceptions continue to deviate from consti-
tutional norms, notwithstanding official assertions "that the same first
amendment principles should be equally applicable to both" the
broadcast and print media. 9 Sexually explicit expression, to the
extent not obscene, is constitutionally protected speech. 110 Even so,
the dissemination of such expression is subject to reasonable time,
place and manner restrictions.1 Accordingly, zoning ordinances
requiring either the concentration or dispersal of adult bookstores and
movie houses have been upheld.112 Official efforts to restrict indecent
programming, however, have included not only time channeling11 3 but
a comprehensive prohibition. 1 4 A total ban was invalidated because
104. Id.
105. The FCC abandoned the fairness doctrine on grounds that scarcity premises were
obsolete. See In re Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. at 5043; see also supra note 56.
106. Congress reintroduced the fairness doctrine but the president vetoed it. See Kenneth
Noble, Reagan Vetoes Measures to Affirm Fairness Policy for Broadcasters, N.Y. TIMEs, June 21,
1987, at 1, cols. 4-5.
107. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3010 (quoting Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
108. See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
109. In re Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. at 5058.
110. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 743 (1978) (indecent expression is "protected
... [although it] lie[s] at the periphery of First Amendment concern").
111. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 52 (1986) (upholding zoning
ordinance requiring concentration of adult bookstores and movie houses); Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (upholding ordinance requiring dispersal of adult
bookstores and movie houses).
112. See Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. at 52; Young, 427 U.S. at 50.
113. The FCC, at one time, had indicated that indecent programming might be allowed after
midnight. Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 3 F.C.C.R. 930, 937 n.47 (1989). The court of appeals
remanded the policy to the Commission on grounds its restrictive nature required more precise
standards and justifications. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1344 (D.C.
Cir. 1989).
114. Upon remand of its time channeling initiative, the FCC established a total ban on
grounds that children are present in the broadcast audience at all hours and thus no less
restrictive means of accounting for regulatory interests exists. Enforcement of Prohibitions
Against Broadcast Indecency, 18 U.S.C. § 1464, 5 F.C.C.R. 5297, 5306-08 (1990).
615
Washington Law Review
the expression was constitutionally protected, and the FCC had not
satisfied "the strict constitutional standard" for its regulation.115 The
reviewing court maintained that First Amendment interests could not
be accommodated without a reasonable safe harbor rule.116 Even such
time channeling sweeps more broadly than supposedly comparable
zoning interests, however, insofar as the broadcast content that is sub-
ject to such restraints may be freely available from other sources.1 17
The result is a levy on expressive pluralism that uniquely burdens
broadcasting and which courts have repudiated for even newer
technologies. 118
The public interest standard is a congressional command that the
FCC is obligated to effectuate. 1 9 Government power to promote First
Amendment aims is not established in precise constitutional terms
comparable, for instance, to congressional capacity to enforce the civil
war amendments.1 20 Regulatory authority instead radiates from the
power to regulate commerce, which establishes plenary federal control
of the field.121 Introduction of the public interest standard has
enhanced the possibilities for regulation beyond the primarily eco-
nomic restrictions that may be imposed upon the print media.
Because its meaning is so susceptible to diverse understandings, how-
ever, the public interest standard has proved to be a risky regulatory
premise.
A few decades ago, the chair of the FCC defined the public interest
in terms of promoting the "character, citizenship and intellectual
capacity of the people." 122 The depiction was accompanied by charac-
115. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504, 1509 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
116. Id at 1509-10.
117. A satirical recording of George Carlin, for instance, became the basis for sanction when
broadcast. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (upholding FCC's determination
that broadcast was indecent and subject to sanction). The recording, however, would be freely
available to adults and children alike on the commercial market.
118. See Community Television, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099, 1114 (D. Utah 1985),
aff'd sub nom Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 480 U.S. 926 (1987).
119. See supra notes 84-101 and accompanying text.
120. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (prohibiting slavery and providing that "Congress shall
have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation"); id., amend. XIV (securing
privileges and immunities, due process and equal protection and providing that "Congress shall
have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article); id., amend. XV
(prohibiting race dependent burdens upon right to vote and providing that "Congress shall ha-e
power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation").
121. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (vesting Congress with power to regulate commerce among
the several states). The Communications Act of 1934 regulates "interstate and foreign commerce
in communication by wire and radio." 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
122. Address of FCC Chairman Newton Minow to the National Association of Broadcasters
(May 9, 1961) (on file with Washington Law Review).
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terization of television as "a vast wasteland." '123 Such'an understand-
ing of the public interest is reminiscent of Louis Brandeis' concern
that the print media at the turn of century had degenerated into pur-
veyors of "idle gossip" that displaced "matters of real interest to the
community." '124 Brandeis' suggestion of a right to privacy responded
to the advent of photojournalism and attention to subjects other than
partisan political debate, which largely had occupied the media when
the First Amendment was framed.125 For traditional media, the pre-
sumption exists that unrestricted editorial discretion, generally identi-
fying and responding to market demands, will provide for the public
interest. 126 The Brandeis focus upon "matters of real interest to the
community," however, is mirrored by regulatory premises defining the
public interest in terms that deviate from a norm of autonomous
rather than authoritative selection. 127  Contemporary attention to
broadcasting as a possible corrupter of morals, especially for children,
is reminiscent further of early jurisprudential responses to the emer-
gence of new media perceived as potentially dangerous influences. 128
Even during the Lochner era of substantive due process review, when
fundamental liberties were expansively glossed upon the Constitution,
such concern dampened the Court's usual generosity in delineating the
contours of freedom. 129
Such accountings for the public interest have demonstrated a peril
to traditional concepts of editorial freedom that, to a certain extent,
even the Court and the FCC have acknowledged. What may be iden-
tified as an imperative of the public interest may be inconsonant with
freedom of the press. Definition of the public interest ultimately is
reducible to expressions of subjective preference that are as debatable
as natural law and no more legitimate than if denominated in terms of
123. Id.
124. Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193,
196 (1890).
125. Id.
126. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974) (right of reply
law invariably diminishes vigor and quality of public debate).
127. See United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (1943) ("right conclusions
are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of
authoritative selection"), aff'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
128. See infra notes 137-46 and accompanying text.
129. See Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230 (1915) (denying motion
pictures press status). The Lochner era, which characterized Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence during the first third of this century, is notable for its identification and expansion
of fundamental rights that limited the exercise of state power. See LAURENCE TRIBE,




public popularity. To the extent criteria for the selection of editors
and editorial content implicate official enforcement, autonomy of the
press remains at risk.
IV. RECLAIMING THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Abandonment of the fairness doctrine suggested the possibility that
broadcasting might evolve finally to fully protected constitutional sta-
tus and that medium-specific analysis might be repudiated. 130 The
FCC noted that "[d]espite the physical differences between the elec-
tronic and print media, their roles in our society are identical, and we
believe that the same First Amendment principles should be equally
applicable to both."13 Official policy as thus redefined indicated
attention to functional similarity rather than structural difference, and
preference for constitutional parity rather than hierarchy.1 32  The
FCC emphasized that the policy "is the method set forth in our Con-
stitution for maximizing the public interest; and furthering the public
interest is likewise our mandate under the Communications Act."
1 33
Constitutional parity for broadcasting, however, is an incomplete and
potentially fleeting condition when used merely to advance the public
interest rather than rooted in the First Amendment itself.134 Because
perceptions of the public interest are competitive and mutable, expres-
sive liberty in broadcasting remains hostage to regulatory inclination
and the model of governance itself remains available for adaptation to
other media.
The overarching constitutional question, now as when new media
began to emerge earlier this century, is whether the First Amendment
will be a comprehensive or selective guarantee. Some theorists have
suggested that partial immunity of the press is a desirable develop-
130. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 377-78 n.12 (1984) (noting FCC
reservations about fairness doctrine and indicating it may "be forced to reconsider the
constitutional basis of our decision" upholding it). But see Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110
S. Ct. 2997, 3010 (1990) ("[wle have long recognized" that spectrum scarcity requires unique
limitations on broadcast licensees).
131. See In re Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5058 (1987) (abandoning fairness
doctrine on grounds it undermines constitutional and public interests), aff'd, Syracuse Peace
Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990).
132. See id. (despite differences in "physical" nature of media, "their roles in our society are
identical").
133. Id.
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ment. 135 To the extent that the dominant medium is the least pro-
tected, however, the reality tends to mock the notion of press
freedom. 136 Reinforcing that impression is the sense that actual regu-
latory concerns are not necessarily as they appear but more sophisti-
cated variants of constitutional insensitivity or misperception.
Early analysis of motion pictures, although acknowledging the
medium's efficacy in expressing opinion, disseminating information
and educating, dwelled primarily upon its potentially dangerous
impact.1 37 The Supreme Court emphasized that "they may be used
for evil," and their "pretense of worthy purpose" combined with their
availability to children "make them the more insidious in corrup-
tion."13 Because motion pictures were "capable of evil, having power
for it, the greater because of their attractiveness and manner of exhibi-
tion,"139 the Court concluded that they were never intended to be
regarded "as part of the press of the country.""''
Although subsequent case law extended constitutional protection to
motion pictures, 41 First Amendment protections remained subject to
media specific regulation and variable First Amendment standards.142
With respect to broadcasting, tendencies for regulatory oversight have
led not only to scarcity theories notable primarily for their deficien-
cies. 14 3 They also have engendered regulation premised upon the same
concern with a corrupting impact that characterized original denial of
press status to motion pictures."4 The weakness of the scarcity
135. See, eg., Lee C. Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access Toward a Theory of
Partial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH L. REv. 1 (1976) (media-specific regulation and
variable First Amendment standards not only defensible but desirable).
136. See ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 1-3 (1983) (noting how
regulation of newer but dominant media effectively narrows scope of First Amendment relative
to its original ambit).
137. Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230, 241-42 (1915).
138. Id. at 242.
139. Id. at 244.
140. Id.
141. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
143. Examples of literature criticizing the fairness doctrine and its underpinnings include:
David L. Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunications Press, 1975 DUKE L. J. 213,
231-32 (1975); Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast
Regulation, 60 TEx. L. REv. 207, 221-26 (1982). Justice Douglas criticized the fairness doctrine
as inimical to First Amendment rights and interests. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
Democratic Nat'1 Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 162-63 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring). The FCC
eventually acknowledged the aptness of such criticism in abandoning the fairness doctrine. In re
Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5049-50 (1987), aff'd, Syracuse Peace Council v.
FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Dir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990).
144. See Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230, 242-244 (1915) (medium's
capacity for evil aggravated by accessibility to children and thus militates against press status).
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rationale, coupled with historical concern for the media's effects, leads
to a reasonable perception that "it is the immediacy and the power of
broadcasting that causes its differential treatment."' 45 Such concern,
even if a basis for regulation calculated to promote First Amendment
values, is at odds with basic imperatives of freedom of the press.
1 46
Repairing the damage to editorial discretion, caused by decades of
constitutional deprivation, requires a comprehensive reinvestment in
traditional principles of press freedom. Regulatory intervention to
advance diversity, if ever acceptable, is not justified by present circum-
stances. Even the FCC, which developed regulation pursuant to scar-
city perceptions, has acknowledged "that the dramatic transformation
in the telecommunications marketplace provides a basis for the Court
to reconsider its application of diminished First Amendment protec-
tion to the electronic media."' 47 Despite that suggestion, the Court
continues to subscribe to scarcity notions and their regulatory
implications. 14
The FCC has revised its understanding of the public interest and
consequently expanded the latitude of expressive freedom for licen-
sees. To minimize the possibility of a paternalistic reversion, however,
it is essential to establish such liberty as a function of the constitution
rather than of administrative principle. Effectuation of that end
requires eliminating the "unusual order" of First Amendment inter-
ests in favor of universal constitutional standards. By making "the
right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters...
paramount,"' 4 9 the Court established a departure point for the erosion
of editorial discretion. Identification and elevation of the public's First
Amendment interests in the context of broadcasting has prompted
expansive notions that would further undermine traditional notions of
press freedom but which largely have been resisted.' 0 The prioritiza-
145. Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 508 (D.C. Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987) (FCC may refuse to apply fairness doctrine to teletext if
reasons adequately justified).
146. One court upheld fairness requirements on grounds that broadcast messages, unlike
those in print, are "in the air." Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cerL
denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969). Given what was perceived as the medium's pervasive nature and an
impact difficult to calculate, the court found that it reasonably might be subject to special
regulatory attention. Id. at 1100-01.
147. In re Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. at 5058.
148. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 309-10 (1990) (upholding
minority preferences in licensing process on grounds they promote content diversity in medium
affected by spectrum scarcity).
149. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
150. The Court has rejected arguments, for instance, that the public's paramount First
Amendment rights justify official preservation of a particular entertainment format or a system
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tion of interests, however, affords a continuing predicate for minimiz-
ing the First Amendment's true significance as a guarantor of
expressive liberty.
An abiding need of the electronic marketplace is for standards of
review that account more sensibly and sensitively for constitutional
and regulatory concerns. Rather than focusing upon and attempting
to balance competing First Amendment rights, the Court would better
serve constitutional and regulatory interests by applying traditional
analytical criteria favoring editorial freedom. Government regulation
of broadcasting, like the print media, thus should be conditioned upon
identification of a compelling state interest, close relationship between
regulatory means and objectives, and the unavailability of any option
less burdensome to expressive interests.151
Pursuant to such a standard, licensing on the whole would survive
as a necessary means for a rational allocation system.152 Although
financial and technical qualifications may serve significant interests,
the operation of alienage restrictions 53 and character qualifications 154
may be at least debatable. Limitations on a person's total broadcast
of public access. See FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582 (1981) (entertainment
format); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973)
(public access).
151. The Court has indicated that the appropriate standard of review for broadcast regulation
is whether the measure "is narrowly tailored to further a substantial governmental interest."
FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380 (1984). The intermediate level of review is
less exacting than the demand for a compelling interest when a constitutional interest is
implicated by regulation. It nonetheless is less deferential than previous analysis that allowed
policy "by those charged with its execution [to] be followed unless there are compelling
indications that it is wrong." Red Lion Broadcasting Co., 395 U.S. at 381. Even pursuant to
existing standards, the Court has continued to refer to the paramount right of viewers and
listeners, Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. at 3010, which diverts attention from whether it is
essential or important to invade editorial discretion to whether it is desirable to manage the
public's interests. The requirement of a substantial justification deviates from usual demands for
a compelling reason but is consistent with the sense of broadcasting as the least protected
medium. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
152. Avoidance of chaos and confusion and consequent waste of a public resource already
have been stressed by the Court as an essential reason for broadcasting's governance under the
Communications Act of 1934. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210-16
(1943).
153. Judicial review of federal laws that discriminate on the basis of alienage has tended to be
relaxed in deference to federal interests in foreign affairs and immigration and naturalization.
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 82-87 (1976). Even so, any classification based on alienage must
reflect "a legitimate governmental interest." United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
154. Modern character standards focus especially upon honesty with the FCC and fraudulent
acts that may affect the public, as well as serious crimes. Character Qualifications Policy, 67
Rad. Reg. 2d 1107 (P & F 1990); Character Qualifications in Broadcast Licensing, 102 F.C.C.R.
1179 (1986). Neither fraud nor criminal activity, however, is grounds for precluding a person
from general publishing. See Lowe v. Securities and Exch. Comm'n, 472 U.S. 181 (1985) (SEC
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holdings might be challenged to the extent that a uniquely compelling
interest fails to justify such a restriction. 155 Similarly, the government
may lack the basis for enacting rules that specially regulate the
employment practices of broadcasters. 156
With respect to content regulation, it is doubtful that fairness
demands would survive. Even if diversification is a compelling inter-
est, experience with the fairness doctrine has demonstrated that it does
not effectively advance regulatory aims and thus is not closely related
to its objective.15 7 Ironically, a less restrictive alternative may be a
system of public access, which the FCC and the Court previously
rejected in favor of a scheme of trustee broadcasting.1 5  Even if a less
burdensome option is chosen, it is doubtful that such a policy could be
justified without extension to all mass media that do not afford practi-
cal opportunity to all for ownership and operation.
The possibility exists that indecency regulation might survive more
constitutionally apt standards. It is well established that regulation
may be justified by an interest in the moral development of children. 59
Governance, however, also must guard against "reduc[ing] the adult
population ... to [receiving] only what is fit for children." 1  At a
minimum, therefore, regulation should not proscribe indecent expres-
may not deny person convicted of securities fraud the opportunity to publish investment
newsletter).
155. The dominance of group ownership in the newspaper industry has been rejected as
grounds for special regulatory attention. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.
241, 249-50 (1974) (noting that "vast changes" have placed in a few hands the power to inform
the American people and shape public opinion). To the extent a newspaper may claim that it is
in danger of failing, it may effect a partial merger with another publication and obtain immunity
from antitrust norms. See Newspaper Preservation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-04 (1988).
156. Especially to the extent that a broadcaster employs at least fifteen persons, it is covered
by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which forbids employment discrimination. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988). In any event, publishers are not gove.ned by medium-specific
regulation of their employment practices. It is doubtful whether a compelling reason could be
identified for regulating employment in one sector of the press but not another.
157. See supra notes 58-60, 100-01 and accompanying text.
158. If regarded as an alternative to fairness regulation, a system of public access simply
would have required the FCC to make quantitative assessments of whether adequate time was
afforded rather than quantitative evaluations of content balance. See Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (rejecting public right of access in
favor of fairness regulation); National Citizens Comm. for Broadcastirg v. FCC, 567 F.2d 1095
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (discussing merits and conditions for system of public access), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 926 (1978).
159. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 641-43 (1958) (noting government's
special interest in speech regulation because of impressionability of children).
160. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
622
Modem Media and the First Amendment
sion entirely from broadcasting.161 Time channeling may be a more
fitting response, despite resulting in disparities between the broadcast
and print media. 62 The regulatory variance, however, would be
attributable to actual differences that were established by particular-
ized inquiry rather than a function of wholesale assumption and
ordained result. Such analytical redirection may avoid arbitrary atten-
tion to unique characteristics and factor truly pertinent differences
into determination of whether an interest is compelling, whether regu-
latory means advance their ends, and whether less restrictive alterna-
tives are available.
Regulatory attention to the broadcast media over the past half-cen-
tury has been reminiscent of equal protection theory that has evolved
over the same period. As the Lochner era of substantive due process
review wound down, the Court indicated that proper standards of con-
stitutional review required deference to legislative judgment unless
express rights were implicated or classifications burdened "discrete
and insular minorities." '63 Courts thereafter predicated strict scrutiny
of racially segregative and discriminatory policies upon an under-
standing of process defect that resulted when groups were formally
excluded from or underrepresented in the political system.164 As pre-
viously unrepresented minorities have acquired influence in the legisla-
tive branch, evidenced by their ability to form coalitions that enable
former pariah groups to account for their interests in rough propor-
tion to their fair influence upon the process, 6 ' justification for exact-
ing review has diminished. 6 6  Similarly, as communications
technology has expanded the possibilities for disseminating and
161. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504, 1509-10 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(requiring safe harbor for indecent broadcasting so that adult interests not held hostage by
standards for children), cerL denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3599 (1992).
162. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
163. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
164. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1973) (strict scrutiny
reserved for instances in which state creates classification that is suspect because it burdens
traditionally disadvantaged minority).
165. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, for instance, was enacted to account for minority anti-
discrimination interests. See Adam Clymer, Senate Approves Civil Rights Bill, 95-5, N.Y. TIMEs,
Oct. 31, 1991, at 1. Similarly, efforts to extend the Voting Rights Act of 1965 overcame
preGidential resistance in the early 1980s.
166. The Court, however, continues to apply strict scrutiny to defeat policies calculated to
remedy the nation's legacy of societal discrimination. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 494-95 (1989) (all racial classifications are suspect even if remedial). Exacting review
thus is exercised as minorities have acquired political power and positions and political
dysfunction to a significant extent has been eroded. See id. at 739-40, 752-53 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (objecting to invalidation of racially preferential policies adopted by minority
dominated city council seeking to remedy past discrimination).
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acquiring information, justification for managing the interests of diver-
sity has abated. Modem reality accordingly demads not standards
that account for illusory defects in the information marketplace, but
criteria connected to the central meaning of the First Amendment.
CONCLUSION
Freedom of the press was not a subject of direct jurisprudential
attention until the twentieth century. Since then, First Amendment
standards have evolved to allow official management of results in a
major sector of the information marketplace. Such regulatory latitude
has been justified by limited opportunity for media ownership and
operation but incongruously has exempted the print media. As new
communications methodologies continue to diminish or alter the role
of publishing, which itself acquires characteristics of regulated media,
a choice with respect to the First Amendment's comprehensive mean-
ing seems unavoidable. The eventual decision likely will have to factor
the foreseeable reality that broadcasting may offer service that is fungi-
ble with cable and common carriers.'67 Regulatory rationales, as
developed so far, have uniform rather than unique pertinence. Unless
providing compelling reasons for official intervention, however, they
should operate neither universally nor selectively in transforming the
editorial process from a system of autonomous choice to authoritative
selection.
167. While cable and telephone companies develop identical capabilities for delivery of video
and data services, a transition to high definition television during the 1990s affords broadcasters
the opportunity to "use digitalization to compete directly with telephone and cable companies,
offering voice and data services from their broadcast towers." Peter Lambert, HDTV- A Game
of Take and Give, BROADCASTING, April 20, 1992, at 6.
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